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I. INTRODUCTION 
Silvia Gonzalez, a Brazilian native fearing deportation from the United 
States, handed over her passport and immigration documents to Marisol, a 
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woman who promised to help obtain a green card for Silvia.1 However, while 
holding Silvia’s immigration documents, Marisol demanded money and 
suggested that Silvia “‘sleep with men in the street’ in order to get her 
immigration documents back.”2 Feeling she had no other choice, Silvia worked as 
a prostitute for two-and-a-half years, living with her captors and giving them all 
the money she made.3 During that period, Silvia acquired a staggering eighty-six 
convictions for prostitution or loitering for the purpose of engaging in 
prostitution.4 “[S]ometimes [Sylvia] would just go up to police officers and ask 
them to take her in. . . . [B]eing in jail was preferable to working on the street.”5 
Though Silvia encountered law-enforcement officers6 on a regular basis (at least 
eighty-six times in a two-and-a-half year period), those officers never recognized 
her as a victim of human trafficking.7 Not only did law enforcement fail to 
recognize her as a victim of crime, but they further victimized her by arresting 
her, labeling her a criminal, and saddling her with a criminal record.8 
It is not uncommon for law-enforcement officers to arrest and prosecute 
human-trafficking victims for engaging in criminal activity when that activity is a 
direct result of their trafficking situation.9 G.M., for another example, was abused 
and trafficked over an eleven-year period, resulting in six criminal convictions—
all directly resulting from her trafficking situation.10 G.M. and her abuser were 
dating, and only after they married did the abuse begin—he beat and raped her, 
 
1. New York v. Gonzalez, 927 N.Y.S.2d 567, 568 (Crim. Ct. 2011). 
2. Id. 
3. Id. 
4. Id. 
5. Id. 
6. For the purpose of this Comment, “law-enforcement officer” refers to any officer or employee of a 
police or sheriff’s department or any peace officer. 
7. Gonzalez, 927 N.Y.S.2d at 568. Law enforcement never recognized Silvia’s trafficking situation. Id. It 
was not until Silvia filed a court motion under Section 440.10(1)(i) of New York Criminal Procedure Law that 
the criminal-justice system recognized her situation as trafficking and vacated her convictions for prostitution 
and loitering for the purpose of engaging in prostitution. Id. at 569–70; see also N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 
440.10(1)(i) (McKinney 2005 & Supp. 2012) (allowing a sex-trafficking victim to seek vacation of prior 
prostitution convictions, provided the crimes were committed as a result of then-present sex trafficking); infra 
Part III.D (providing an overview and analysis of the New York law). 
8. See Gonzalez, 927 N.Y.S.2d at 568 (Silvia had been convicted eighty-six times.). 
9. See, e.g., id. (vacating the convictions of a trafficking victim arrested for prostitution and loitering for 
the purpose of prostitution); see also New York v. Doe, 935 N.Y.S.2d 481, 482–83 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011) 
(vacating the convictions of a trafficked teen arrested multiple times for loitering for the purpose of 
prostitution); New York v. G.M., 922 N.Y.S.2d 761, 762–63 (Crim. Ct. 2011) (vacating the convictions of a 
trafficking victim arrested for prostitution and loitering for the purpose of prostitution); Susan Kelleher, Teen 
Missing After Testimony Against Pimp, SEATTLE TIMES (Dec. 20, 2010), http://seattletimes.nwsource.com 
/html/localnews/2013719994_missing20m.html (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (describing a teen 
arrested multiple times for prostitution and loitering for the purpose of prostitution); Barbara Goldberg, New 
Yorker Expunges Prostitution Record Under Trafficking Law, REUTERS (Sept. 21, 2011), http://www.reuters. 
com/article/011/09/21/ussextrafficking-idUSTRE78K7Q320110921 (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) 
(trafficked teen arrested multiple times for prostitution and loitering for the purpose of prostitution). 
10. G.M., 922 N.Y.S.2d at 762–63. 
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imprisoned her, watched her every move, and eventually forced her into 
prostitution.11 G.M. complied with her husband’s demands because, in addition to 
his history of abuse, he threatened to harm or kill her children, who remained in 
her native Dominican Republic.12 She escaped to the Dominican Republic on two 
separate occasions, but returned to the United States each time with her abuser.13 
After successfully escaping for good, G.M. still had a criminal record as a result 
of her sex-trafficking situation, and her employer of five years terminated her 
when they discovered her convictions.14 
Minors arrested for prostitution are likewise further victimized by the 
criminal-justice system. For example, the Seattle Police Department first arrested 
Kelsey Emily Collins for prostitution when she was a sophomore in high 
school.15 Kelsey amassed multiple arrests and criminal charges before a police 
officer recognized the signs of sex trafficking.16 Similarly, Ms. Johnson was only 
thirteen years old when she began prostituting for her trafficker-boyfriend.17 Over 
a six-year period, Ms. Johnson was convicted of prostitution three times, and the 
arresting officers never recognized her as a trafficking victim.18 
These cases indicate, first, that human-trafficking victims encounter law-
enforcement officers during the officers’ day-to-day duties.19 This contact creates 
an opportunity for law-enforcement officers to recognize the individual as a 
victim, interrupt the trafficking cycle, obtain social services for the victim, and 
prosecute the real criminal: the trafficker. Second, these cases indicate that law-
enforcement officers not only fail to recognize human-trafficking victims as 
victims rather than criminals, but also subject victims to criminal treatment, 
complete with arrests, convictions, and a criminal record—what this Comment 
refers to as “dual victimization.”20 “[T]rafficking victims should not be punished 
 
11. Id. 
12. Id. 
13. Id. G.M. returned to the United States each time due to her abuser’s coercive tactics: the first time 
after promising he would change, and the second time when he threatened “to harm a close family friend.” Id. 
14. Id. at 763. While G.M. successfully challenged her termination, her criminal record would 
nonetheless pose a hurdle for future employment. Id. The New York Criminal Court took this burden into 
consideration in vacating G.M.’s record pursuant to Section 440.10(1)(i) of New York Criminal Procedure Law. 
Id.; see also infra Part III.D (discussing the New York law). 
15. Kelleher, supra note 9. 
16. Id. Oregon, which treats any minor engaging in the sex trade as a victim of crime, recognizes 
Kelsey’s status as that of a victim, rather than a criminal guilty of prostitution. OR. REV. STAT. § 12.117(d) 
(2011) (classifying prostitution of a minor as child abuse). 
17. Goldberg, supra note 9. 
18. See id. (explaining that it was a customer who helped Ms. Johnson escape). 
19. Robert Moossy, Sex Trafficking: Identifying Cases and Victims, 262 NAT’L INST. OF JUST. J. 2, 3 
(2009), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/225759.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
“Most cases prosecuted by DOJ to date have been identified by line-level police officers who encounter sex 
traffickers or their victims during the normal course of operations: during routine traffic stops, on domestic 
violence calls, while inspecting liquor licenses, and when intercepting truant children.” Id. 
20. For the purpose of this Comment, “dual victimization” refers to when the criminal-justice system 
fails to recognize human-trafficking victims as victims and treats them as criminals instead. This criminal 
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for crimes that are a direct result of being trafficked . . . . They should be treated 
as victims.”21 While recognizing human trafficking is difficult,22 if law-
enforcement officers proactively look for it, they are more likely to recognize 
victims of human trafficking. In turn, law-enforcement officers will be more 
likely to prevent dual victimization by treating those identified victims as victims 
rather than as criminals. 
Law-enforcement officers’ failure to recognize human trafficking does not 
indicate a failure to maintain high-level job performance, and this Comment does 
not assert any wrongdoing by these individuals. Rather, as victims are unlikely to 
seek help or be forthcoming to law enforcement about their situations,23 it is 
imperative that law-enforcement officers proactively look for signs of human 
trafficking. Law-enforcement officers must also know what social services a 
victim will need to permanently escape his or her trafficking situation. 
Misunderstanding abounds regarding human trafficking in the United 
States.24 In jurisdictions devoid of human-trafficking training for law-
enforcement officers, it is even more likely that an officer will fail to recognize 
the signs and treat the victim as a criminal rather than as a victim of crime.25 In 
other words, absent trafficking training, it is more likely that a victim, who could 
have had meaningful contact with the law leading to freedom and prosecution of 
the real criminal (the trafficker), will be further victimized by the criminal-justice 
system. At this point, the opportunity to interrupt the trafficking cycle is lost, 
what this Comment refers to as “slipping through the cracks” of the criminal-
justice system.26 
This Comment asserts the number of trafficking victims charged and 
prosecuted for crimes indicates a systemic failure within the criminal-justice 
system to recognize human trafficking and its players, and that the states should 
implement statutory changes, including mandatory training for law-enforcement 
officers. 
Part II of this Comment provides a brief overview of human trafficking in the 
United States. In particular, Part II dispels popular misconceptions regarding 
 
treatment—often including arrests, charges, prosecutions, and criminal records—further victimizes a human-
trafficking victim: a dual victimization. 
21. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT 36 (2007), available at http://www.state. 
gov/documents/organization/82902.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
22. See infra Part II.B (discussing the difficulties in recognizing trafficking victims). 
23. See id. 
24. See infra Part II.A (dispelling popular myths about trafficking). 
25. Karen J. Bachar, Combating Human Trafficking at the State and Local Levels, 262 NAT’L INST. OF 
JUST. J. 8 (2009), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/225759.pdf (citation omitted) (on file with the 
McGeorge Law Review). 
26. For the purpose of this Comment, “slipping through the cracks” refers to when a human-trafficking 
victim comes into contact with a law-enforcement officer, and although there is an opportunity to recognize the 
trafficking and provide victim assistance, the officer fails to do so and the opportunity to interrupt the 
trafficking cycle is lost. 
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human trafficking, including that which is most dangerous to trafficking victims: 
that modern-day slavery (human trafficking) does not exist, or, if it does, that it is 
an issue unique to underdeveloped nations and not present in the United States.27 
Part II also examines why trafficking is so difficult to recognize and why victims 
are unlikely to seek help from law enforcement.28 Part III surveys how 
jurisdictions respond when a trafficking victim is charged with a crime 
committed due to a trafficking situation. Most jurisdictions do not provide formal 
relief for a criminally prosecuted human-trafficking victim.29 Some states allow 
victims to claim human trafficking as an affirmative defense to criminal 
charges,30 while New York allows victims to seek vacation of prior convictions 
on a showing of trafficking.31 
Finally, Part IV recommends a three-part statutory response to dual 
victimization: (1) mandating human-trafficking training for all law-enforcement 
officers; (2) including human trafficking as an affirmative defense to crimes 
committed due to the trafficking situation; and (3) allowing vacation of prior 
convictions on a showing of human trafficking. While this Comment argues that 
all jurisdictions should enact these three recommendations, this Comment 
focuses primarily on preventing dual victimization before it occurs, and only 
secondarily on providing relief to trafficking victims who slip through the cracks. 
Therefore, Part IV focuses on requiring human-trafficking training for law-
enforcement officers, using mandatory domestic-violence training as a model.32 
 
27. See Myths and Misconceptions, POLARIS PROJECT, http://www.polarisproject.org/human-
trafficking/overview/myths-and-misconceptions (last visited July 7, 2012) (on file with the McGeorge Law 
Review) (providing an overview of commonly held human-trafficking myths). 
28. Moossy, supra note 19, at 3–6. 
29. As this Comment goes to press, nine states had provided some form of recourse for a criminally 
prosecuted trafficking victim. See ALA. CODE § 13A-6-159 (LexisNexis 2012) (providing an affirmative 
defense); IOWA CODE ANN. § 710A.3 (West Supp. 2011) (providing an affirmative defense); MINN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 609.325(4) (West 2009) (providing an affirmative defense); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 645:2(IV) (LexisNexis 
2012) (providing an affirmative defense); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:34-1(e) (West 2005) (providing an affirmative 
defense); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 440.10(1)(i) (McKinney 2005 & Supp. 2012) (allowing a victim to seek 
vacation of judgment); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 748(D) (West Supp. 2012) (providing an affirmative 
defense); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 43.02(d) (West 2011) (providing an affirmative defense to an actor who 
was “the victim of conduct that constitutes an offense under” section 20A.02 of the Texas Penal Code, which 
lists the elements of trafficking of persons); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 939.46(1m) (West Supp. 2011) (providing an 
affirmative defense “for any offense committed as a direct result of the violation of [section 940.302(2) of the 
Wisconsin Criminal Code],” which describes human trafficking). 
30. ALA. CODE § 13A-6-159; IOWA CODE ANN. § 710A.3; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.325(4); N.H. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 645:2(IV); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:34-1(e); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 748(D); TEX. PENAL CODE 
ANN. § 43.02(d); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 939.46(1m). 
31. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 440.10(1)(i). 
32. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 13519 (West 2012) (requiring police officers receive training in the 
“nature and extent of domestic violence,” how to recognize domestic violence, and issues commonly related to 
a domestic-violence situation). 
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II. HUMAN TRAFFICKING IN THE UNITED STATES 
As a “hot button topic,”33 people are more aware that human trafficking exists 
and that it exists in the United States.34 However, common-held beliefs about 
human trafficking are often mere myths, which are problematic for combating 
dual victimization.35 Furthermore, even the most well-informed law-enforcement 
officer is still encumbered by the inherent difficulties in recognizing human 
trafficking.36 
A.  Overview of Human Trafficking 
Human trafficking is “the recruitment, harboring, transportation, provision, 
or obtaining of a person for labor or services, through the use of force, fraud, or 
coercion for the purpose of subjection to involuntary servitude, peonage, debt 
bondage, or slavery.”37 Human trafficking is an umbrella term for “when one 
person obtains or holds another person in compelled service,” including, but not 
limited to, forced labor,38 sex trafficking,39 and bonded labor.40 This Comment 
uses the umbrella term “human trafficking” to include any number of trafficking 
classifications.41 
Despite its status as a “hot button topic,”42 misunderstanding about human 
trafficking in the United States abounds.43 These misunderstandings are 
 
33. Allison Navarro, Human Trafficking: A Hot-Button Topic, UNITED NATIONS ASS’N OF SAN DIEGO 
(United Nations Ass’n and the Business Council of the United Nations, San Diego Chapter, San Diego, CA) 
Summer 2009, at 9 (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
34. See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT 372 (2011), available at 
http://www.state.gov/g/tip/rls/tiprpt/2011/ [hereinafter TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT 2011] (on file with 
the McGeorge Law Review) (“The United States is a source, transit, and destination country for men, women, 
and children subjected to forced labor, debt bondage, document servitude, and sex trafficking.”). 
35. See POLARIS PROJECT, supra note 27 (“To effectively combat human trafficking, each of us needs to 
have a clear ‘lens’ that helps us understand what human trafficking is. When this lens is clouded or biased by 
certain persistent misconceptions about the definition of trafficking, our ability to respond to the crime is 
reduced.”). 
36. See infra Part II.B (discussing the difficulties in recognizing human trafficking). 
37. TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT 2011, supra note 34, at 8. 
38. Id. at 7. Forced labor or involuntary servitude “may result when unscrupulous employers exploit 
workers made more vulnerable by high rates of unemployment, poverty, crime, discrimination, corruption, 
political conflict, or cultural acceptance of the practice.” Id. 
39. Id. Sex trafficking occurs “[w]hen an adult is coerced, forced, or deceived into prostitution—or 
maintained in prostitution through coercion . . . .” Id. 
40. Id. at 7–8. Bonded labor or debt bondage occurs when “traffickers or recruiters unlawfully exploit an 
initial debt the worker assumed as part of the terms of employment.” Id. 
41. This Comment disproportionately focuses on sex trafficking, even though the proposed statutory 
changes are to combat dual victimization for all human-trafficking victims. This is because certain statutes 
described herein apply only to sex-trafficking victims. See, e.g., N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 440.10(1)(i) 
(McKinney 2005 & Supp. 2012) (permitting vacation of judgment for prostitution or loitering for the purpose of 
prostitution only, effectively precludes many human-trafficking victims from seeking this relief). 
42. Navarro, supra note 33. 
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especially problematic if held by a law-enforcement officer. For example, human 
trafficking does not require “physical restraint, physical force, or physical 
bondage.”44 A law-enforcement officer under the mistaken assumption that 
trafficking requires physical restraint will undoubtedly fail to recognize a 
trafficking victim walking freely about. Another commonly held 
misunderstanding is that victims of crime generally seek assistance from law 
enforcement.45 However, due to distrust, fear, or the fact that a trafficking victim 
may engage in criminal activity as part of his or her trafficking situation, 
trafficking victims often do not seek help.46 Perpetuation of these 
misunderstandings exacerbates the already tremendous difficulty in recognizing 
human trafficking and its players.47 Therefore, it is imperative that law-
enforcement officers proactively look for signs indicative of human trafficking. 
B.  The Difficulty in Recognizing Human Trafficking 
Human trafficking is difficult to recognize for many reasons. Human 
trafficking is often “a hidden crime,” and sex trafficking is even more so, often 
“perpetuated in alleys, brothels and illicit massage parlors.”48 Also, victims may 
travel between jurisdictions, leaving little time for law enforcement to recognize 
the crime and its players and to prosecute accordingly.49 Furthermore, 
recognizing an individual engaging in criminal activity as a victim of crime 
rather than as a perpetrator of crime is counterintuitive to the criminal-justice 
system. This Comment acknowledges the difficulty for a law-enforcement officer 
to simultaneously view a trafficked person as both a criminal committing an 
offense and a victim compelled by a human-trafficking situation to commit that 
offense. 
In addition to being difficult to recognize, human-trafficking victims do not 
often seek help and may even hide the reality of their situation.50 It is not 
uncommon for trafficking victims to protect their traffickers, at least initially.51 
 
43. See generally POLARIS PROJECT, supra note 27 (providing an overview of commonly held 
misconceptions about human trafficking in the United States). 
44. Id. 
45. Id. 
46. Id. 
47. See infra Part II.B (discussing the difficulties in recognizing human trafficking). 
48. Moossy, supra note 19, at 3. 
49. E.g., TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT 2011, supra note 34, at 37. But see id. at 8 (“A victim need 
not be physically transported from one location to another in order for the crime to fall within these 
definitions.”). 
50. See POLARIS PROJECT, supra note 27 (“Victims of human trafficking often do not immediately seek 
help or self-identify as victims of crime due to a variety of factors, including lack of trust, self-blame, or 
specific instructions by the traffickers regarding how to behave when talking to law enforcement or social 
services.”). 
51. See Moossy, supra note 19, at 5 (noting that a victim may have an emotional attachment to or love 
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Trafficking “victims are often highly traumatized, having lived through months 
or even years of brutality . . . . In some instances, victims develop survival or 
coping mechanisms that manifest as distrust, deceptiveness and an unwillingness 
to accept assistance.”52 Through force and humiliation, traffickers control their 
victims to convince them that “the police will not help them and will be 
interested only in arresting the victims for [crimes committed] or for being 
undocumented.”53 A victim may fear deportation if undocumented,54 may have an 
emotional connection to the trafficker,55 or may fear retaliation from the 
trafficker.56 Furthermore, as a trafficking victim’s previous encounter with law 
enforcement may have involved an arrest, a trafficking victim may distrust law 
enforcement.57 
III. FAILING TO RECOGNIZE TRAFFICKING VICTIMS: A MULTIJURISDICTIONAL 
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
While human trafficking is a crime under federal law,58 failing to recognize 
the crime and its players may lead to prosecuting the victim rather than the 
trafficker.59 When a human-trafficking victim commits a crime due to a then-
present trafficking situation, there is a vast discrepancy in jurisdictional 
responses.60 Ideally, the law-enforcement officer who encounters a trafficking 
victim would recognize the situation and treat the individual as a victim rather 
than as a criminal.61 A law-enforcement officer is more likely to recognize human 
trafficking—thereby more likely to interrupt the trafficking cycle—if he or she 
has had human-trafficking training.62 However, if an officer fails to recognize a 
 
for his or her trafficker, or may fear retaliation if the victim seeks help from the police). 
52. Id.  
53. Id. at 6–7. 
54. Id. at 5. For example, fearing deportation, Silvia Gonzalez voluntarily handed over her identifying 
documents to her trafficker, relying on the trafficker’s promise to obtain a green card for her. New York v. 
Gonzalez, 927 N.Y.S.2d 567, 568 (Crim. Ct. 2011). 
55. Moossy, supra note 19, at 5; see also, e.g., New York v. G.M., 922 N.Y.S.2d 761, 762–63 (Crim. Ct. 
2011) (G.M.’s husband trafficked her.); Kelleher, supra note 9 (Kelsey Collins’ boyfriend trafficked her.); 
Goldberg, supra note 9 (Ms. Johnson’s boyfriend trafficked her.). 
56. Moossy, supra note 19, at 6. Victims may fear retaliation because the “[t]rafficker may have 
threatened to harm them or their families if they are truthful.” Id. 
57. See id. at 4–5 (providing an example of a sex-trafficking victim fearing arrest for prostitution if he or 
she seeks help). 
58. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1581–96 (2006). 
59. See, e.g., Gonzalez, 927 N.Y.S.2d 567; G.M., 922 N.Y.S.2d 761; Kelleher, supra note 9; Goldberg, 
supra note 9 (Silvia, G.M., Kelsey Collins, and Ms. Johnson were all prosecuted for crimes committed due to 
their status as human-trafficking victims.). 
60. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-6-159 (LexisNexis 2012) (providing an affirmative defense for a 
trafficking victim charged with a crime); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 440.10(1)(i) (McKinney 2005 & Supp. 
2012) (allowing vacation of judgment for certain crimes committed by a trafficking victim). 
61. A dual victimization. 
62. See POLARIS PROJECT, supra note 27 (“To effectively combat human trafficking, [law-enforcement 
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trafficking situation and arrests the victim, a majority of jurisdictions do not 
provide any remedy to the victim.63 Some states allow victims to raise human 
trafficking as an affirmative defense.64 New York takes a unique approach and 
allows victims to seek vacation of a prior conviction on a showing of then-
present trafficking.65 
While providing an affirmative defense or the option to seek vacation of a 
prior conviction are important statutory steps, either form of relief is too narrow 
to apply to all trafficking victims.66 Furthermore, neither form of relief prevents 
dual victimization; both an affirmative defense and vacation of prior convictions 
provide relief after the dual victimization has already occurred.67 
A.  Federal Anti-Trafficking Efforts 
This Comment focuses on the systemic failure to recognize human 
trafficking at the state level. However, federal measures provide a baseline in 
combating human trafficking in the United States; therefore, it would be remiss 
to exclude them. Federal law criminalizes human trafficking.68 The Trafficking 
Victims Protection Act of 2000, reauthorized in 2008, creates victim support 
programs and task forces to combat human trafficking.69 The Department of 
Justice (DOJ) established trafficking task forces in forty-two jurisdictions.70 As 
the DOJ task forces investigate trafficking cases to provide victim support, task 
forces are a means of combating trafficking generally,71 thereby rescuing victims 
 
officers need] to have a clear ‘lens’ that helps [them] understand what human trafficking is.”). It is unlikely law-
enforcement agencies will train officers on human trafficking, as very few jurisdictions require it. See infra Part 
IV.A (discussing the statutes mandating human-trafficking training for law-enforcement officers). 
63. As this Comment goes to press, nine states provided some form of recourse for a criminally 
prosecuted trafficking victim. See ALA. CODE § 13A-6-159 (providing an affirmative defense); IOWA CODE 
ANN. § 710A.3 (West Supp. 2011) (providing an affirmative defense); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.325(4) (West 
2009) (providing an affirmative defense); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 645:2(IV) (LexisNexis 2012) (providing an 
affirmative defense); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:34-1(e) (West 2005) (providing an affirmative defense); N.Y. CRIM. 
PROC. LAW § 440.10(1)(i) (allowing a victim to seek vacation of judgment); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 
748(D) (West Supp. 2012) (providing an affirmative defense); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 43.02(d) (West 2011) 
(providing an affirmative defense); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 939.46(1m) (West Supp. 2011) (providing an affirmative 
defense). 
64. ALA. CODE § 13A-6-159; IOWA CODE ANN. § 710A.3; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.325(4); N.H. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 645:2(IV); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:34-1(e); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 748(D); TEX. PENAL CODE 
ANN. § 43.02(d); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 939.46(1m). 
65. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 440.10(1)(i). 
66. See infra Part III.C (discussing affirmative defense to charges); Part III.D (discussing vacation of 
prior convictions). 
67. See infra Part III.E (discussing how either response fails to combat dual victimization, but provides 
an important form of relief for human-trafficking victims). 
68. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1581–96 (2006). 
69. 22 U.S.C. §§ 7101–12 (2006 & Supp. IV 2011). 
70. Moossy, supra note 19, at 5. 
71. See id. (stating that DOJ task forces combine local, state, and federal law enforcement to proactively 
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before they are further victimized by the criminal-justice system. While many 
states provide additional measures to combat trafficking, victims still slip through 
the cracks.72 
B.  Mandatory Human-Trafficking Training for Law-Enforcement Officers 
A recent study revealed that, generally, law-enforcement officers could not 
identify different types of human trafficking or its elements, and “could not . . . 
[d]istinguish trafficking from smuggling.”73 This indicates a failure to adequately 
train law-enforcement officers to recognize trafficking victims they may 
encounter during their careers. In contrast, law-enforcement agencies that have a 
human trafficking task force74 “are more likely to perceive human trafficking as a 
problem in their communities and to have training, protocols and specialized 
units of personnel devoted to investigating these cases.”75 
Human-trafficking victims typically encounter law-enforcement officers 
during the officers’ day-to-day duties.76 Therefore, officers’ mere presence 
provides a crucial opportunity to interrupt the trafficking cycle by recognizing 
trafficking victims, facilitating victim rescue, potentially finding other trafficking 
victims,77 and prosecuting the real criminal: the trafficker. With sex trafficking 
specifically, “the trafficker must obtain a stream of paying clients . . . and provide 
an array of new victims. Both these activities require traffickers to become more 
‘public,’ providing opportunities for law enforcement to intervene.”78 As the 
number of law-enforcement officers on the street at any given time is limited, 
having officers who do not know how to recognize trafficking wastes this 
precious resource. 
It is imperative that law-enforcement officers are trained to recognize the 
signs of human trafficking, know what to do when they encounter a suspected 
trafficking victim or trafficker, and proactively look for trafficking in their 
community. Failure to recognize the problem—which is more likely when the 
law-enforcement officers have not received trafficking training79—allows 
trafficking victims to slip through the cracks. Silvia was convicted eighty-six 
 
investigate cases and identify victims, which would effectively interrupt the trafficking cycle). 
72. See supra Part I (providing several examples of human-trafficking victims prosecuted for crimes 
committed due to a then-present trafficking situation). 
73. Bachar, supra note 25. 
74. See supra notes 70–71 and accompanying text. 
75. Bachar, supra note 25. 
76. Moossy, supra note 19, at 3. 
77. Id. at 7. 
78. Id. at 3. 
79. Bachar, supra note 25. This Comment does not allege any wrongdoing on behalf of law-enforcement 
officers. Rather, this Comment seeks to expose a systemic failure to recognize trafficking victims as victims 
rather than as criminals, and propose ways to combat this dual victimization. 
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times without law enforcement recognizing her as a victim of crime;80 G.M. was 
arrested six times;81 Kelsey Collins82 and Ms. Johnson83 were each arrested several 
times without being recognized as victims, even though they were minors at the 
time of their arrests. 
As this Comment goes to press, only seven states84 require human-trafficking 
training for law-enforcement officers.85 Of these states, some impose broad, non-
descriptive obligations requiring merely that law-enforcement agencies provide a 
training.86 In contrast, other states impose a descriptive list of topics that must be 
covered during a mandatory human-trafficking training, such as Indiana’s 
mandatory-training statute.87 As human trafficking involves complex issues,88 this 
Comment argues that human-trafficking training must cover those issues in 
detail, and that the mandatory-training statute must reflect the necessity of such 
detail by itemizing a list of topics to be covered during this training.89 A 
descriptive statute will protect against holding a superficial and uninformative 
training merely to meet the minimum requirement of the statute. Furthermore, the 
mobile nature of human trafficking also cautions against states enacting a non-
descriptive statutes to ensure that law-enforcement officers respond to human 
trafficking similarly regardless of jurisdiction. 
 
80. New York v. Gonzalez, 927 N.Y.S.2d 567, 568–69 (Crim. Ct. 2011). Gonzalez was so desperate to 
get off of the street, “sometimes she would just go up to police officers and ask them to take her in.” Id. 
81. New York v. G.M., 922 N.Y.S.2d 761, 762 (Crim. Ct. 2011). As a result of her trafficker’s abuse, 
G.M. visited the hospital for medical care. Id. That the hospital staff also failed to recognize G.M. as a 
trafficking victim indicates a need for mandatory human-trafficking training for individuals in the medical field 
and social services. However, this exceeds the scope of this Comment. 
82. Kelleher, supra note 9. Unlike Gonzalez, G.M., and Ms. Johnson, a police officer eventually 
recognized Kelsey Collins as a trafficking victim; however, she had multiple arrests prior to her meaningful 
contact with law enforcement, leading to escape, albeit temporarily, from her trafficking situation. Id. 
83. Goldberg, supra note 9. 
84. California, Indiana, Iowa, Missouri, New Mexico, Texas, and Virginia. 
85. CAL. PENAL CODE § 13519.14 (West 2012); IND. CODE ANN. § 5-2-1-9(a)(10) (West 2008); IOWA 
CODE ANN. § 80B.11(2)(e) (West 2009); MO. ANN. STAT. § 566.223 (West Supp. 2011); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 
30-52-3 (LexisNexis 2012); TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. § 1701.258 (West 2012); VA. CODE ANN. § 9.1-102(55) 
(West 2012). 
86. See, e.g., TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. § 1701.258 (requiring law-enforcement officers to take a four-hour 
training “including a review of the substance of” penal code sections defining human trafficking); see also VA. 
CODE ANN. § 9.1-102(55) (requiring a training “regarding the identification, investigation, and prosecution of 
human trafficking offenses . . . ”). 
87. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 5-2-1-9(a)(10) (requiring law-enforcement officers undergo training 
examining “the human and sexual trafficking laws”; “[i]dentification of human and sexual trafficking”; 
“[c]ommunicating with traumatized persons”; “[t]herapeutically appropriate investigative techniques”; 
“[c]ollaboration with federal law enforcement officials”; “[r]ights of and protections afforded to victims”; and 
“[t]he availability of community resources to assist human and sexual trafficking victims”). 
88. Complex issues such as recognizing a trafficking situation, victims’ distrust of the criminal-justice 
system, and what social services a victim will likely need to successfully escape the trafficking situation and 
maintain freedom. 
89. See supra note 87 (listing topics to be covered under Indiana’s human-trafficking training statute). 
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Statutory training requirements set the minimum requirements, not the 
maximum.90 Therefore, law-enforcement officers may undergo human-trafficking 
training, through continuing education or an informal training, even though not 
required by a majority of jurisdictions.91 As human trafficking is and has been a 
“hot button topic,”92 it is likely that many law-enforcement officers receive 
human-trafficking training while not statutorily mandated to do so. However, as 
most law-enforcement officers cannot recognize the difference between the types 
of human trafficking or the difference between smuggling and human 
trafficking,93 this informal training is clearly insufficient. 
Mandatory training will give law-enforcement officers the tools they need to 
recognize trafficking victims, thereby preventing dual victimization. However, 
no amount of training will provide adequate relief to those trafficking victims 
who will inevitably slip through the cracks.94 Therefore, it is imperative that in 
addition to mandating human-trafficking training for law-enforcement officers, 
jurisdictions also provide relief to those victims who slip through the cracks.95 
C.  Affirmative Defense to Criminal Charges 
The Center for Women Policy Studies recommends all jurisdictions make 
human trafficking an affirmative defense to criminal charges.96 An affirmative 
defense defeats the “prosecution’s claim, even if all the allegations in the 
complaint are true.”97 Therefore, the defendant does not challenge committing the 
crime or its elements, but rather “seeks to justify, excuse, or mitigate it.”98 Unlike 
a simple defense, the defendant bears the burden of proof to establish the specific 
facts to mitigate the charges.99 Common affirmative defenses to criminal charges 
include insanity and self-defense.100 
 
90. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 53-6-207 (West 2007) (“The minimum standards in this part 
concerning peace officer qualifications and training do not preclude counties, cities, or towns from establishing 
standards higher than the minimum standards contained in this part.”). 
91. Id.; supra note 85 and accompanying text. 
92. Navarro, supra note 33. 
93. Bachar, supra note 25. 
94. As human trafficking is inherently difficult to recognize, even the finest trained individuals may fail 
to recognize a trafficking situation. See supra Part II.B (discussing the difficulties in recognizing human 
trafficking). 
95. See infra Part III.C (describing human trafficking as an affirmative defense to criminal charges); Part 
III.D (describing vacation of prior judgment based on then-present human trafficking). 
96. NAT’L INST. ON STATE POLICY ON TRAFFICKING OF WOMEN & GIRLS, RESOURCE GUIDE FOR STATE 
LEGISLATORS: MODEL PROVISIONS FOR STATE ANTI-TRAFFICKING LAWS 4 (2005), available at http://www. 
centerwomenpolicy.org/pdfs/TraffickingResourceGuide.pdf [hereinafter MODEL PROVISIONS] (on file with the 
McGeorge Law Review). 
97. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 190 (3d Pocket ed. 2006). 
98. 21 AM. JUR. 2D Criminal Law § 182 (2008) (citations omitted). 
99. Id. 
100. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 97. 
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As this Comment goes to press, eight states101 have some type of affirmative 
defense for crimes committed by a trafficking victim.102 Of these eight states, 
Alabama, Iowa, Minnesota, New Hampshire, Texas, and Wisconsin allow an 
affirmative defense to criminal charges if the defendant was a trafficking victim 
when the crime was committed, and the crime was a direct result of the 
defendant’s trafficking situation.103 Of those six states, Iowa and Minnesota more 
narrowly require not only that the defendant committed the charged crime or 
crimes during a trafficking situation, but also did so under force or threat of 
force.104 New Jersey and Oklahoma are broader, requiring neither direct relation 
between the crime committed and the trafficking situation, nor a force or threat of 
force requirement.105 Rather, these two states merely require that the defendant 
was a human-trafficking victim when he or she committed the crime.106 
Additionally, of these eight states providing an affirmative defense, the 
majority only apply the defense to prostitution and prostitution-related 
offenses,107 thereby providing a remedy to sex-trafficking victims only. In 
contrast, only Iowa, Oklahoma, and Wisconsin provide an affirmative defense for 
crimes committed as a direct result of a then-present human-trafficking 
situation.108 
A jurisdiction providing an affirmative defense as a form of relief for a 
human-trafficking victim facing criminal charges may implement a broad or 
narrow defense, depending on its statutory drafting.109 For example, the Center 
for Women Policy Studies proposes language that would include any crime 
 
101. Alabama, Iowa, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Oklahoma, Texas, and Wisconsin. 
102. ALA. CODE § 13A-6-159 (LexisNexis 2012); IOWA CODE ANN. § 710A.3 (West Supp. 2011); 
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.325(4) (West 2009); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 645:2(IV) (LexisNexis 2012); N.J. 
STAT. ANN. § 2C:34-1(e) (West 2005); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 748(D) (West Supp. 2012); TEX. PENAL 
CODE ANN. § 43.02(d) (West 2011); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 939.46(1m) (West Supp. 2011). 
103. ALA. CODE § 13A-6-159; IOWA CODE ANN. § 710A.3; MINN. STAT. § 609.325(4); N.H. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 645:2(IV); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 43.02(d); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 939.46(1m). 
104. IOWA CODE ANN. § 710A.3; MINN. STAT. § 609.325(4). 
105. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:34-1(e); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 748(D). 
106. Id. 
107. ALA. CODE § 13A-6-159; MINN. STAT. § 609.325(4); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 645:2(IV); N.J. 
STAT. ANN. § 2C:34-1(e); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 43.02(d). 
108. IOWA CODE ANN. § 710A.3; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 748(D); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 939.46(1m). 
Therefore, had Silvia Gonzales been in one of these three states, she would have also had an affirmative defense 
to her conviction for resisting arrest, in addition to her prostitution-related offenses. See New York v. Gonzalez, 
927 N.Y.S.2d 567, 569 (Crim. Ct. 2011) (stating that, under New York law, Gonzalez had no redress for her 
resisting arrest conviction). 
109. Compare N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:34-1(e), and OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 748(D) (providing that a 
defendant must show he or she was a trafficking victim when the crime was committed to successfully raise an 
affirmative defense), with IOWA CODE ANN. § 710A.3, and MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.325(4) (requiring a 
defendant show three elements to successfully raise an affirmative defense: (1) the defendant was a trafficking 
victim when he or she committed the crime; (2) the crime was directly related to that trafficking situation; and 
(3) the defendant acted under force or threat of force). 
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committed while “the defendant was a victim of human trafficking,”110 thereby 
encompassing all crimes committed during a trafficking situation—even if those 
crimes did not stem directly from that trafficking situation.111 However, such 
statutes may be drafted narrowly as well, such as Iowa Code section 710A.3, 
requiring that the defendant’s crime stem directly from the human-trafficking 
situation and that the defendant commit the crime under force or threat of force in 
order for the affirmative defense to apply.112 
While an affirmative defense certainly provides judicial relief for criminally 
prosecuted trafficking victims, this form of relief is far from perfect.113 By 
limiting the crimes to which the affirmative defense applies to prostitution and 
loitering for the purpose of prostitution, the majority of the jurisdictions 
providing this relief effectively limit its availability to sex-trafficking victims, 
rather than to the broader classification of human-trafficking victims.114 
Furthermore, even if this relief is available to a sex-trafficking victim for 
prostitution or loitering for the purpose of prostitution, the defendant may have 
other charges to which the affirmative defense does not apply, even if the 
defendant proves a then-present sex-trafficking situation.115 Additionally, the 
Iowa and Minnesota statutes are even more limited; not only do they require that 
the defendant committed the crime or crimes during a trafficking situation, but 
also under force or threat of force, thereby imposing another obstacle to 
successfully raising an affirmative defense.116 
Some of the barriers to recognizing human-trafficking victims generally and 
sex-trafficking victims in particular also present a barrier to a victim claiming the 
defense.117 For example, trafficking victims may have feelings for, be in a 
 
110. MODEL PROVISIONS, supra note 96, at 4. Proposed language: “It is an affirmative defense to 
prosecution for a criminal violation that, during the time of the alleged commission of the offense, the defendant 
was a victim of human trafficking.” Id. 
111. Id. 
112. IOWA CODE ANN. § 710A.3. 
113. See infra notes 114–25 and accompanying text (discussing the limitations of an affirmative defense 
for crimes directly related to a trafficking situation). 
114. Compare ALA. CODE § 13A-6-159 (LexisNexis 2012), and MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.325(4), and 
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 645:2(IV) (LexisNexis 2012), and N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:34-1(e), and TEX. PENAL 
CODE ANN. § 43.02(d) (West 2011) (limiting the applicability of the affirmative defense to prostitution and 
loitering for the purpose of prostitution charges), with IOWA CODE ANN. § 710A.3, and OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 
21, § 748(D), and WIS. STAT. ANN. § 939.46(1m) (West Supp. 2011) (containing no limit on what types of 
crimes the affirmative defense applies to, provided the defendant was a human-trafficking victim at the crime’s 
commission). 
115. See ALA. CODE § 13A-6-159; MINN. STAT. § 609.325(4); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 645:2(IV); N.J. 
STAT. ANN. § 2C:34-1(e); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 43.02(d) (limiting the applicability of the affirmative 
defense to prostitution and loitering for the purpose of prostitution charges). For example, a victim like Sylvia 
Gonzalez would be unable to raise an affirmative defense for resisting arrest, which was a direct result of her 
then-present sex-trafficking situation, where the affirmative defense is limited to prostitution-related offenses. 
New York v. Gonzalez, 927 N.Y.S.2d 567, 569 (Crim. Ct. 2011). 
116. IOWA CODE ANN. § 710A.3; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.325(4). 
117. See supra Part II.B (indicating the inherent difficulties in recognizing trafficking victims). 
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relationship with, or even be in love with their traffickers.118 In this case, claiming 
the affirmative defense would force the defendant to incriminate the person they 
love—the trafficker.119 Even if the trafficking victim has no feeling of intimacy 
towards the trafficker, due to the coercion and fear the trafficker uses to control 
trafficking victims, a trafficked person is not likely to be forthcoming and 
implicate the trafficker as a criminal.120 Trafficking victims may also fear 
retaliation from their traffickers if they were to claim trafficking as an affirmative 
defense in court.121 Additionally, language barriers or misunderstandings about 
individual rights may prevent a victim from claiming trafficking as an affirmative 
defense.122 
More importantly, this form of relief does not combat dual victimization.123 
Rather, by the time this relief is available to a trafficking victim, the criminal-
justice system already arrested, charged, and prosecuted the defendant as a 
criminal rather than recognizing him or her as a victim of crime.124 Therefore, 
while providing an affirmative defense for crimes committed while the defendant 
was a trafficking victim is an important form of relief for when trafficking 
victims slip through the cracks, it does not combat dual victimization.125 
D.  Vacate Judgment upon a Showing of Trafficking 
If a criminal defendant is unable or unwilling to raise an affirmative defense 
for crimes committed due to a then-present human-trafficking situation,126 the 
 
118. Moossy, supra note 19, at 5; TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT 2011, supra note 34, at 25; see also 
New York v. G.M., 922 N.Y.S.2d 761, 762–63 (Crim. Ct. 2011) (G.M.’s husband trafficked her.); Kelleher, 
supra note 9 (Kelsey Collins’ boyfriend trafficked her.); Goldberg, supra note 9 (Ms. Johnson’s boyfriend 
trafficked her.). 
119. Moossy, supra note 19, at 5; TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT 2011, supra note 34, at 25; see also 
G.M., 922 N.Y.S.2d at 762–63; Kelleher, supra note 9; Goldberg, supra note 9. 
120. See Moossy, supra note 19, at 5 (“[V]ictims develop survival or coping mechanisms that manifest 
as distrust, deceptiveness and an unwillingness to accept assistance.”). 
121. See id. at 6 (“[T]he trafficker may have threatened to harm them or their families if they are 
truthful. This may lead victims to deceive law enforcement, especially early in the process.”). 
122. See id. at 6–7 (providing that traffickers may tell their victims that if they try to go to the police for 
help, the police will arrest them for prostitution or for being in the country illegally). 
123. Of course, if a defendant successfully raises the affirmative defense, then the trafficking victim will 
not be saddled with a criminal record. However, this Comment argues that even without a resulting criminal 
record, being arrested as a criminal rather than recognized as a victim is sufficient to constitute dual 
victimization. 
124. See 21 AM. JUR. 2D Criminal Law § 182 (2008) (citations omitted) (stating that affirmative 
defenses, like simple defenses, are raised during trial). 
125. See id. (As a human trafficking victim raises an affirmative defense, if at all, during trial, dual 
victimization has already occurred.). 
126. It is unlikely a defendant could raise such an affirmative defense, because only a few jurisdictions 
provide one. ALA. CODE § 13A-6-159 (LexisNexis 2012); IOWA CODE ANN. § 710A.3 (West Supp. 2011); 
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.325(4) (West 2009); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 645:2(IV) (LexisNexis 2012); N.J. 
STAT. ANN. § 2C:34-1(e) (West 2005); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 748(D) (West Supp. 2012); TEX. PENAL 
CODE ANN. § 43.02(d) (West 2011); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 939.46(1m) (West Supp. 2011). Additionally, it is 
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criminal-justice system saddles that trafficking victim with a criminal record in 
all but one jurisdiction.127 In 2010, New York passed landmark legislation 
allowing a sex-trafficking victim to seek vacation of prior convictions, provided 
“the defendant’s participation in the offense was a result of having been a victim 
of sex trafficking,”128 which the defendant must prove by a preponderance of the 
evidence.129 Additionally, New York recognizes any minor engaging in 
prostitution or loitering for the purpose of prostitution as a trafficking victim.130  
To vacate a prior conviction is to invalidate the conviction.131 Therefore, the 
timing for a vacation of judgment differs from an affirmative defense. An 
affirmative defense is raised, if at all, during a defendant’s trial, and therefore, 
before a conviction.132 Vacation of prior conviction proceedings occur after a 
court enters a formal judgment against a criminal defendant.133 
For the purpose of the New York statute, sex trafficking is defined under 
either New York state law134 or the federal Trafficking Victims Protection Act.135 
This statute is limited to sex trafficking and does not extend to the broader 
category of human trafficking.136 To move for a vacation of a prior conviction, the 
 
likely a defendant would be unwilling to raise such a defense because of the emotional intricacies and distrust of 
the legal system involved in a human trafficking situation. See supra Part III.C (discussing why an affirmative 
defense, even in a jurisdiction providing one, is not an ideal form of relief for a human-trafficking victim). 
127. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 440.10 (McKinney 2005 & Supp. 2012) (allowing sex-trafficking 
victims to seek a vacation of prior conviction); Press Release, Urban Justice Center’s Sex Workers Project, 
Governor Paterson Signs First in the Nation Bill Allowing Survivors of Sex Trafficking to Clear Prostitution 
Convictions (Aug. 16, 2010), available at http://assembly.state.ny.us/member_files/075/20100816/ 
statement.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
128. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 440.10(1)(i). Providing official documentation showing a then-existing 
sex-trafficking situation creates a presumption that the defendant’s crime stems from the trafficking situation. 
Id. § 440.10(1)(i)(ii). Such documentation, however, is not required for a motion to vacate under section 
440.10(1)(i). Id. 
129. New York v. Gonzalez, 927 N.Y.S.2d 567, 570 (Crim. Ct. 2011). 
130. See New York v. Doe, 935 N.Y.S.2d 481, 483 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011) (providing the trend in this 
area of law indicates “a strong expression that those engaging in prostitution, or commercial sex, under the age 
of eighteen are to be viewed as victims of trafficking, rather than perpetrators of crime.”). Treating minors 
engaging in prostitution as victims rather than criminals is a growing trend in other jurisdictions. See, e.g., OR. 
REV. STAT. § 12.117(d) (2011) (classifying prostitution by a minor as child abuse). 
131. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 97, at 753 (“To nullify or cancel; make void; 
invalidate.”). 
132. See 21 AM. JUR. 2D Criminal Law § 182 (2008) (citations omitted) (Affirmative defenses are raised 
to “justify, mitigate, or excuse” a crime.). 
133. 47 AM. JUR. 2D Judgments § 655 (2006). 
134. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 230.34 (McKinney 2008) (defining sex trafficking categorically as: 
intentionally profiting from prostitution by (1) unlawfully providing drugs to a trafficked individual; (2) 
“making material false statements, misstatements, or omissions to induce [the trafficked person] to engage 
in . . . prostitution”; (3) withholding a trafficked person’s identification documents to “impair said person’s 
freedom of movement”; (4) requiring the trafficked person to engage in prostitution for debt repayment; and (5) 
using fear or force to induce the trafficked person to engage in prostitution). 
135. 22 U.S.C. § 7102(9) (2006) (defining sex trafficking broadly as “the recruitment, harboring, 
transportation, provision, or obtaining of a person for the purpose of a commercial sex act”). 
136. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 440.10(1)(i) (McKinney 2005 & Supp. 2012). 
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statute requires due diligence, which is satisfied if the movant is no longer a 
victim of sex trafficking and it is safe to make such a motion.137 Provided the 
defendant satisfies the due diligence requirement, even if the criminal case 
against him or her is still appealable, the defendant may nevertheless file a 
motion to vacate at any time after sentencing.138 This statute does not require a 
showing of any particular facts, which allows broad judicial discretion to 
determine whether the movant has shown “he or she was a sex-trafficking 
victim.”139 
Despite broad judicial discretion, the New York law is nevertheless limited, 
as it only applies to prostitution or loitering for the purpose of engaging in 
prostitution convictions stemming from the sex-trafficking situation.140 Therefore, 
a trafficking victim who commits an offense other than these two crimes has no 
parallel relief—under even New York’s landmark legislation.141 Similarly, in 
Silvia Gonzalez’s case,142 the court denied her motion to vacate her prior 
conviction for resisting arrest, because resisting arrest was “not a prostitution 
related offense.”143 This is the state of the law even though Gonzalez successfully 
demonstrated that she was a sex-trafficking victim at the time of that offense.144 
However, as the G.M. court145 noted, “a valid issue remains as to whether the 
statute can be applied to non-prostitution offenses where the defendant was a 
demonstrated sex-trafficking victim during their commission. [New York Penal 
Law section] 440.10(6) allows the court to ‘take such additional action as is 
 
137. Id. § 440.10(1)(i)(i). 
138. See id. § 440.10(2)(b) (Where appellate review is possible, the court must deny a motion to vacate 
prior convictions. However, this section explicitly does not apply to trafficking victims.); see also id. § 
440.10(3)(a) (granting judicial discretion to deny a motion where the record prior to sentencing does not include 
facts supportive of vacation of prior convictions. This section does not apply to trafficking victims.). 
139. New York v. Gonzalez, 927 N.Y.S.2d 567, 570 (Crim. Ct. 2011). “[T]he legislature did not require 
any specific corroborating facts or other evidence which would to [sic] support a defendant’s application . . . . 
By avoiding bright-line rules and formulaic determinations, the legislature squarely gave the Courts the 
discretion to grant relief pursuant to [New York Criminal Procedure Law section] 440.10(1)(i) . . . .” Id. 
140. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 440.10(1)(i) (allowing vacation of judgment “where the arresting 
charge was under [New York Penal Law] section 240.37 (loitering for the purpose of engaging in a prostitution 
offense . . . ) or [New York Penal Law] 230.00 (prostitution) . . . and the defendant’s participation in the offense 
was  result of having been a victim of sex trafficking . . . .”). But cf. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 939.46(1m) (West Supp. 
2011) (providing a defendant with “an affirmative defense for any offense committed as a direct result” of then-
existing human trafficking) (emphasis added). 
141. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 440.10(1)(i) (applying only to prostitution or loitering for the purpose 
of prostitution). 
142. See supra notes 1–7 and accompanying text. 
143. Gonzalez, 927 N.Y.S.2d at 569. 
144. Id. The court did, however, vacate eighty-six prior convictions for either prostitution or loitering for 
the purpose of engaging in a prostitution offense. Id. at 568, 571. But cf. New York v. G.M., 922 N.Y.S.2d 761, 
766 (Crim. Ct. 2011) (vacating all six of G.M.’s prior convictions, including trespass and drug possession, even 
though her two prostitution convictions were the only ones covered by the statute; this is more of a procedural 
decision rather than statutory interpretation, because the prosecution consented to the vacation of these 
convictions in addition to the prostitution convictions). 
145. See supra notes 10–14 and accompanying text (describing G.M., 922 N.Y.S.2d 761). 
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appropriate in the circumstances[.]’”146 As this Comment goes to press, no New 
York court had extended Criminal Procedure Law section 440.10(6) to a non-
prostitution offense.147 
Enacting New York Criminal Procedure Law section 440.10(1)(i) allows for 
an increase in motions to vacate prior convictions.148 One may argue this will 
“‘open the flood gates’ of prior prostitution convictions insofar as those 
defendants can just come into court and claim that they were the victims of sex 
trafficking . . . and have their convictions vacated.”149 However, the New York 
City Criminal Court found this argument “dogmatic and unpersuasive.”150 
Furthermore, “even if the floodgates open by granting [vacations of prior 
convictions under New York Criminal Procedure Law section 440.10(1)(i)], the 
Courts can easily deny frivolous motions . . . .”151 Additionally, the court 
emphasized the importance of providing relief for a trafficking victim outweighs 
the concern for any administrative burden the law may impose on the judicial 
system.152 
On the one hand, New York Criminal Procedure Law section 440.10(1)(i) is 
very limited.153 The vacation statute only applies to sex trafficking, rather than all 
instances of human trafficking;154 it only vacates convictions for prostitution and 
loitering for the purpose of engaging in prostitution, rather than for other crimes 
stemming from a sex-trafficking situation.155 Furthermore, as trafficking victims 
are likely to be wary of the court system that criminally prosecuted them, they 
are not likely to pursue judicial relief.156 Even more important to this Comment, 
the New York statute provides relief to a sex-trafficking victim only after the 
victim has been arrested, charged, and criminally prosecuted.157 In other words, 
when the criminal-justice system fails to recognize a trafficking victim as a 
 
146. G.M., 922 N.Y.S.2d at 766 n.7 (citing N.Y. PENAL LAW § 440.10(6)). 
147. See id. at 762–63; see also New York v. Doe, 935 N.Y.S.2d 481, 482–83 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011); 
Gonzalez, 927 N.Y.S.2d at 570 (vacating prior convictions for prostitution and loitering for the purpose of 
prostitution). 
148. See Gonzalez, 927 N.Y.S.2d at 570 (referring to the prosecution’s unsuccessful argument). 
149. Id. 
150. Id. 
151. Id. 
152. See id. (“[T]he defendant’s ability to continue putting her life back together after [her sex 
trafficking situation] heavily outweighs any increased motion practice that may result hereafter.”). 
153. See supra notes 140–47 and accompanying text (describing the novel law’s limitations). 
154. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 440.10(1)(i) (McKinney 2005 & Supp. 2012). 
155. Id. 
156. See Gonzalez, 927 N.Y.S.2d at 570 (providing that “victims of human trafficking are often too 
wary of authorities or too traumatized by their experiences to be able or willing to timely report their 
victimization”); supra Part II.B (discussing why victims often do not seek help and why they may distrust the 
criminal-justice system generally). 
157. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 440.10(1)(i) (allowing a sex trafficking victim to bring a motion to 
vacate prior convictions, as opposed to allowing a victim to bring an affirmative defense). 
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victim, the victim slips through the cracks, and the opportunity to interrupt the 
trafficking cycle is lost.158 
Despite the limited applicability of New York’s vacation statute and its 
failure to combat dual victimization, the statute gives “‘victims of human 
trafficking the fresh start they deserve’ by vacating criminal records that can 
serve as barriers to employment, housing and citizenship applications.”159 
E.  Too Little, Too Late 
As this Comment goes to press, no jurisdiction has a combination of all three 
of the above statutory responses to when a trafficking victim commits a crime 
due to a then-present trafficking situation.160 Standing alone, any one of these 
forms of relief is insufficient. While providing an affirmative defense and 
vacating judgment on a showing of trafficking are important statutory changes 
for all jurisdictions to adopt, they come too little, too late. By the time a case 
goes to trial, the criminal-justice system already failed to recognize a human-
trafficking victim and instead prosecuted the victim as a criminal perpetrator. 
Therefore, while these retroactive measures are important to catch victims who 
slip through the cracks, these initiatives are of secondary importance to those 
combating dual victimization before it occurs—primarily, requiring human-
trafficking training for law-enforcement officers.161 
Mandatory-trafficking training for law-enforcement officers—a critical 
means of combating dual victimization—is not widely implemented.162 As 
human-trafficking victims encounter law-enforcement officers during the 
officers’ day-to-day duties,163 training officers how to recognize human 
trafficking is the best strategy to combat dual victimization. 
Of the forms of relief available to trafficking victims prosecuted for crimes 
committed due to their trafficking situations, only a combination of all three 
initiatives will combat dual victimization before it occurs and provide relief for 
 
158. A dual victimization. 
159. Noleen G. Walder, City Bar Urges Passage of Law for Sex-Trafficking Victims, N.Y.L.J., Apr. 12, 
2010 (quoting N.Y.C. BAR COMM. ON SEX & LAW, REPORT ON A.7670/S.4429, at 4 (Mar. 2010)). 
160. See N.Y.C. BAR COMM. ON SEX & LAW, REPORT ON A.7670/S.4429, at 4 (Mar. 2010), available at 
http://www.nycbar.org/pdf/report/uploads/20071848-CommentonLegislationreVictimsofSexTrafficking.pdf (on 
file with the McGeorge Law Review) (providing that the New York legislation is the first of its kind in the 
country). As New York (the only jurisdiction with a vacation of prior judgment statute) does not have an 
affirmative defense for trafficking, no jurisdiction has all three.  
161. See supra Part III.B (discussing the important of human-trafficking training for law-enforcement 
officers). 
162. As this Comment goes to press, only seven states required human-trafficking training for law-
enforcement officers: California, Indiana, Iowa, Missouri, New Mexico, Texas, and Virginia. CAL. PENAL 
CODE § 13519.14 (West 2012); IND. CODE ANN. § 5-2-1-9(a)(10) (West 2008); IOWA CODE ANN. § 
80B.11(1)(e) (West 2009); MO. ANN. STAT. § 566.223 (West Supp. 2011); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-52-3 (West 
2012); TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. § 1701.258 (West 2012); VA. CODE ANN. § 9.1-102(55) (West 2012). 
163. Moossy, supra note 19, at 3. 
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those victims who will inevitably slip through the cracks. Therefore, this 
Comment recommends a three-part statutory response to dual victimization: (1) 
mandating human-trafficking training for law-enforcement officers; (2) providing 
human trafficking as an affirmative defense to crimes committed as a direct result 
of a then-present human-trafficking situation; and (3) allowing vacation of 
judgment upon a showing of human trafficking.164 
IV. COMBATING DUAL VICTIMIZATION: A PROPOSAL 
This Comment argues the number of human-trafficking victims charged and 
prosecuted for crimes related to their trafficking situations indicates a systemic 
failure within the criminal-justice system to recognize human trafficking and its 
players and prosecute accordingly. When a human-trafficking victim is arrested 
and charged for crimes committed as a result of a then-present trafficking 
situation, a dual victimization occurs. This dual victimization is best prevented 
when law-enforcement officers know the signs of human trafficking, proactively 
look for it during their day-to-day duties, and know what services the victim will 
need to escape and maintain freedom from his or her trafficking situation.165 
Despite even the best training for law-enforcement officers, trafficking victims 
will inevitably slip through the cracks. Therefore, it is imperative that each 
jurisdiction also implement after-the-fact relief: providing human-trafficking 
victims the options of raising an affirmative defense during trial or vacating a 
prior judgment for crimes committed as a direct result of a then-present 
trafficking situation. 
A.  Preventing Dual Victimization: Mandatory Human-Trafficking Training for 
Law-Enforcement Officers 
“In most communities police officers may be the only meaningful contact 
citizens have with ‘the law.’”166 A substantial number of trafficking victims are 
identified by police officers engaged in their day-to-day duties.167 Therefore, law-
enforcement officers are generally in the best position to interrupt the trafficking 
 
164. As a statutory response, each individual state would have to enact such legislation. While this may 
seem untenable, a similar federal law would be an inappropriate exertion of control over the states, and would 
therefore be unconstitutional. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 926 (1997) (quoting New York v. 
United States, 505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992)) (internal quotation marks omitted) (“The Federal Government . . . may 
not compel the States to enact or administer a federal regulatory program.”)  
165. See Bachar, supra note 25 (“[T]he difficulty of uncovering and investigating human trafficking 
cases is often caused by a lack of training, the need for enhanced communication between local law 
enforcement and victim service agencies, and the hidden nature of this crime.”). 
166. See Joan Zorza, Symposium on Domestic Violence: Criminal Law: The Criminal Law of 
Misdemeanor Domestic Violence 1970–1990, 83 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 46, 47 (1992) (discussing the 
importance of domestic-violence training for police officers). 
167. Moossy, supra note 19, at 3. 
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cycle,168 and it is essential that officers know how to recognize human trafficking. 
If it were mandatory for law-enforcement officers to receive human-trafficking 
training, it is likely that an officer would have recognized Silvia Gonzalez,169 
G.M.,170 Kelsey Collins,171 and Ms. Johnson172 as victims. 
In 2007, the California Attorney General’s Office recommended a mandatory 
human-trafficking training for law-enforcement officers.173 However, trafficking 
training is far from universally required, as only seven states require all law-
enforcement officers undergo human-trafficking training.174 That so few 
jurisdictions mandate human-trafficking training for law-enforcement officers is 
troubling for many reasons. First, law-enforcement officers are in the best 
position to recognize trafficking and interrupt its cycle.175 Failure to train officers 
to recognize situations they will likely encounter during the course of their duties 
is a waste of precious resources. Second, law-enforcement training absent any 
statutory mandate may result in the officers receiving insufficient information on 
the subject.176 In addition to ensuring law-enforcement officers are well informed 
and prepared to recognize trafficking and provide victim assistance, the mobile 
nature of human trafficking renders it particularly important that all law-
enforcement officers receive uniform training.177 
While imposing mandatory law-enforcement training is an integral step in 
preventing dual victimization, this Comment recognizes it is unwieldy to 
 
168. Id. 
169. See New York v. Gonzalez, 927 N.Y.S.2d 567, 568 (Crim. Ct. 2011) (Sylvia Gonzalez had 
acquired eighty-six convictions for prostitution or loitering for the purpose of prostitution over a two-and-a-half 
year period, and law enforcement never recognized her as a human-trafficking victim.). 
170. See New York v. G.M., 922 N.Y.S.2d 761 (Crim. Ct. 2011) (G.M. had acquired six convictions.). 
171. See Kelleher, supra note 9 (noting that law-enforcement officers arrested Kelsey Collins multiple 
times before an officer in another state recognized her as a human-trafficking victim). 
172. See Goldberg, supra note 9 (noting that Ms. Johnson acquired three convictions for prostitution 
and, despite her status as a minor, law enforcement never recognized her as a trafficking victim). 
173. CAL. ALLIANCE TO COMBAT TRAFFICKING & SLAVERY TASK FORCE, HUMAN TRAFFICKING IN 
CAL.: FINAL REPORT 5 (2007), available at http://ag.ca.gov/publications/Human _Trafficking_Final_Report.pdf 
(on file with the McGeorge Law Review). The Attorney General’s Office recommended mandatory trafficking 
training for other individuals likely to encounter human-trafficking victims during the course of their 
employment (health professionals, service providers, and other first responders). Id. 
174. CAL. PENAL CODE § 13519.14 (West 2012); IND. CODE ANN. § 5-2-1-9(a)(10) (West 2008); IOWA 
CODE ANN. § 80B.11 (West 2009); MO. ANN. STAT. § 566.223 (West Supp. 2011); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-52-3 
(LexisNexis 2012); TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. § 1701.258 (West 2012); VA. CODE ANN. § 9.1-102(55) (West 
2012). 
175. Moossy, supra note 19, at 3. “Most cases prosecuted by DOJ to date have been identified by line-
level police officers who encounter sex traffickers or their victims during the normal course of operations: 
during routine traffic stops, on domestic violence calls, while inspecting liquor licenses, and when intercepting 
truant children.” Id. 
176. See supra notes 88–93 and accompanying text (examining the shortfalls of informal human-
trafficking training); Bachar, supra note 25 (evidencing the insufficiencies of informal human-trafficking 
training). 
177. See Moossy, supra note 19, at 4 (“Sex traffickers often operate in multijurisdictional networks, 
transporting their victims to various brothels, motels, communities and towns.”). 
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recommend a state-by-state statutory change. However, as it would be 
unconstitutional to impose a similar federal mandate,178 a state-by-state statutory 
change is the only remaining option. Furthermore, as unwieldy as it may be, 
mandatory domestic-violence training for law-enforcement officers progressed 
through a similar state-by-state enactment; currently, twenty-five states impose 
mandatory domestic-violence training for law-enforcement officers.179 Therefore, 
as cumbersome as it may be, this multijurisdictional legislative progression is not 
unprecedented, and domestic-violence training provides legislators with a 
model.180 
1.  Mandatory Domestic-Violence Training: A Model 
Mandatory domestic-violence training provides a model for mandatory 
human-trafficking training. While only seven states mandate human-trafficking 
training for law-enforcement officers,181 twenty-five states182 mandate domestic-
violence training for all law-enforcement officers.183 State statutes requiring 
domestic-violence training for law-enforcement officers vary in the breadth and 
depth of information covered. Some statutes impose a detailed list of issues 
arising around domestic violence to be covered in a required training.184 In 
 
178. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 926 (1997) (quoting New York v. United States, 
505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992)) (internal quotations omitted) (“The Federal Government . . . may not compel the 
States to enact or administer a federal regulatory program.”). 
179. See infra note 183 (Alaska, California, Connecticut, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Kentucky, 
Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, Nebraska, New Jersey, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, 
Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin). 
180. See infra Part IV.A.1 (discussing the progression of mandatory domestic-violence training enacted 
state-by-state). 
181. CAL. PENAL CODE § 13519.14 (West 2012); IND. CODE ANN. § 5-2-1-9(a)(10) (West 2008); IOWA 
CODE ANN. § 80B.11 (West 2009); MO. ANN. STAT. § 566.223 (West Supp. 2011); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-52-3 
(LexisNexis 2012); TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. § 1701.258 (West 2012); VA. CODE ANN. § 9.1-102 (LexisNexis 
2012). 
182. Alaska, California, Connecticut, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Kentucky, Maine, Massachusetts, 
Michigan, Missouri, Nebraska, New Jersey, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South 
Dakota, Tennessee, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin. 
183. ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 18.65.510 (2010); CAL. PENAL CODE § 13519; CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7-
294g (West 2008); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 943.1701 (West 2006); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 39-6316 (2011); 50 ILL. 
COMP. STAT. ANN. 705/7 (West 2005); IOWA CODE ANN. § 80B.11(1)(a)–(b); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
15.334(1)(b) (West Supp. 2011); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 2803-B(1)(D) (West Supp. 2011); MASS. GEN. 
LAWS ANN. ch. 6, § 116A (West Supp. 2012); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 776.22 (West 2006); MO. ANN. 
STAT. § 590.040 (West 2011); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 42-927 (West 2008); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-20 
(West 2005); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 214-b (McKinney 2010); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-07.1-14 (2004); OHIO REV. 
CODE ANN. § 109.73 (LexisNexis 2007); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 3311.5(G) (West Supp. 20111); R.I. GEN. 
LAWS ANN. § 12-29-6 (2002); S.D. ADMIN. R. 2:01:08:04(5) (2011); TENN. CODE ANN. § 38-8-112(37) (2003); 
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 2365 (West 2012); VA. CODE. ANN. § 9.1-102; WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.99.030 
(West 2012); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 165.85(b)(1d)(a) (West Supp. 2011). 
184. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 13519(c) (requiring law-enforcement officers to undergo a domestic-
violence training covering the “nature and extent of domestic violence,” “signs of domestic violence,” “legal 
rights of, and remedies to, victims of domestic violence,” “impact on children of law enforcement intervention 
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contrast, some of the statutes are non-descriptive and merely require that law-
enforcement officers attend a domestic-violence training.185 Inherent in non-
descriptive mandatory-training statutes is the danger of under-informative or 
inconsistent trainings. 
While only twenty-five states have mandatory domestic-violence training, 
this state-by-state enactment provides a model for a similar state-by-state 
mandate for human-trafficking training. 
2.  Mandatory Human-Trafficking Training for All Law-Enforcement 
Officers 
Using domestic-violence training as a model, this Comment argues that every 
jurisdiction should mandate human-trafficking training for its law-enforcement 
officers. Furthermore, due to the need for consistency across jurisdictions and the 
breadth of issues arising around human trafficking,186 this Comment proposes a 
statutory amendment imposing detailed obligations and topics to be covered, 
more like the existing Indiana statute,187 as opposed to the vague Texas statute.188 
Of course, there are certain drawbacks to implementing mandatory human-
trafficking training for all law-enforcement officers. First, mandating training 
will have a substantial fiscal impact on each state. In addition to the initial 
expense in enacting a new statute, the training itself will require initial funding 
and continued maintenance. However, as many jurisdictions already require 
continuing education for law-enforcement officers, requiring human-trafficking 
training does not “result in increased costs” because this existing funding may 
support human-trafficking training.189 Additionally, if law-enforcement officers 
are trained to recognize the signs of trafficking, it is reasonable to assume that 
more traffickers will be criminally prosecuted, thereby increasing pressure on the 
 
in domestic violence,” “services and facilities available to victims and batterers,” among other topics). 
185. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-07.1-14 (requiring law-enforcement officers undergo “an 
education and training program . . . concerning the handling of crimes involving domestic violence,” stressing 
“the enforcement of criminal laws in domestic violence cases and the use of community resources”). 
186. See Moossy, supra note 19, at 4 (“Because traffickers are mobile and cross jurisdictional lines, 
victim identification training must be implemented not just in one jurisdiction, but in neighboring jurisdictions 
as well.”). 
187. IND. CODE ANN. § 5-2-1-9(a)(10) (West 2008) (requiring law-enforcement officers undergo 
training examining “the human and sexual trafficking laws”; “[i]dentification of human and sexual trafficking”; 
“[c]ommunicating with traumatized persons”; “[t]herapeutically appropriate investigative techniques”; 
“[c]ollaboration with federal law enforcement officials”; “[r]ights of and protections afforded to victims”; and 
“[t]he availability of community resources to assist human and sexual trafficking victims”). 
188. See TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. § 1701.258 (West 2012) (requiring law-enforcement officers to take a 
four-hour training “includ[ing] a review of the substance of” penal code sections defining human trafficking). 
189. See County of Los Angeles v. Comm’n on State Mandates, 2 Cal. Rptr. 3d 419, 429 (Ct. App. 
2003) (addressing similar fiscal concerns for implementing mandatory domestic violence training, and holding 
that requiring domestic violence training will not increase costs for law enforcement training as the state can use 
the existing continuing education fund for law-enforcement officers). 
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prison system. While the financial impact of implementing mandatory training is 
a substantial burden, a cost-benefit analysis dictates that individual freedom and 
justice must outweigh the fiscal impact. 
Another concern with implementing mandatory human-trafficking training 
for law enforcement is that there is no way to ensure consistency across state 
lines. However, the same is true of mandatory domestic-violence training, yet 
twenty-five states imposed mandatory domestic-violence training.190 
Perhaps the best criticism of this proposal is the argument that it is only 
necessary to implement such a training program in highly trafficked-to areas. 
However, due to the mobility of human trafficking191 and the issues of 
underreporting and inaccurate statistics, limiting such training to only certain 
states creates an unworkable line-drawing issue.192 
Therefore, despite these valid criticisms of a multi-state statutory scheme to 
mandate human-trafficking training for all law-enforcement officers, the 
importance of recognizing a victim of a crime and treating him or her as such 
rather than as a criminal outweighs any other state interest. Mandatory human-
trafficking training for law-enforcement officers is the best way to provide law 
enforcement with the tools they need to recognize trafficking and interrupt the 
trafficking cycle, thereby preventing dual victimization. 
B.  After-the-Fact Relief 
Because human trafficking is so difficult to recognize, human-trafficking 
victims will inevitably slip through the cracks, even with the best law-
enforcement training in place.193 Therefore, it is imperative that states provide 
remedies for those human-trafficking survivors who slipped through the cracks of 
the criminal-justice system, in addition to preventative measures.194 This 
Comment urges states to provide both an affirmative defense to criminal charges 
and vacation of judgment on a showing of then-present human trafficking.195 
 
190. See supra Part IV.A.1 (discussing existing domestic violence training for law-enforcement 
officers). 
191. See Moossy, supra note 19, at 4 (“Sex traffickers often operate in multijurisdictional networks, 
transporting their victims to various brothels, motels, communities and towns.”). 
192. Should mandatory training be required only in the highest trafficked-to states? The highest 
trafficked-to and neighboring states? Will such a line-drawing scheme be reviewed in the future to see if 
“highly trafficked-to” states have changed? 
193. See supra Part II.B (discussing the difficulties in recognizing human trafficking). 
194. See infra Part IV.B.1. This Comment urges each state to enact an affirmative defense that a 
criminal defendant may raise when the crime committed was a direct result of a then-present human-trafficking 
situation. The trafficking victim need not show any force or threat of force to prevail on such a defense. 
195. See infra Part IV.B.2 (explaining why both forms of relief, while important, are insufficient when 
taken alone). 
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1.  Affirmative Defense to Criminal Charges 
Providing an affirmative defense for defendants to raise during trial is an 
imperative form of relief for those human-trafficking victims who slip through 
the cracks. Currently, only eight states provide any affirmative defense,196 and 
this Comment argues the majority of these statutes are too limited to provide 
effective relief for human-trafficking victims.197 Conversely, a few of the existing 
statutes are too broad and would apply to too many crimes.198 
In light of the existing and flawed affirmative defense statutes,199 this 
Comment urges each state to enact an affirmative defense that a criminal 
defendant may raise when the crime committed was a direct result of a then-
present human-trafficking situation.200 The trafficking victim need not show any 
force or threat of force to prevail on such a defense.201 Furthermore, the 
affirmative defense must be available to more human-trafficking victims than the 
majority of the existing statutes currently allow for. Specifically, the affirmative 
defense must apply to crimes other than prostitution and loitering for the purpose 
of prostitution.202 This Comment recognizes that there are certain crimes to which 
 
196. ALA. CODE § 13A-6-159 (LexisNexis 2012); IOWA CODE ANN. § 710A.3 (West Supp. 2011); 
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.325(4) (West 2009); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 645:2(IV) (LexisNexis 2012); N.J. 
STAT. ANN. § 2C:34-1(e) (West 2005); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 748(D) (West Supp. 2012); TEX. PENAL 
CODE ANN. § 43.02(d) (West 2011); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 939.46(1m) (West Supp. 2011). 
197. See ALA. CODE § 13A-6-159; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.325(4); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 645:2(IV); 
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:34-1(e); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 43.02(d) (limiting the affirmative defense to charges 
for prostitution and loitering for the purpose of prostitution, thereby effectively limiting the defense to sex-
trafficking victims rather than the broader category of human-trafficking victims); see also IOWA CODE ANN. § 
710A.3; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.325(4) (requiring not only the direct relation between the crime committed 
and the trafficking situation, but also a showing of force or threat of force); supra Part III.C (discussing the 
limitations of most of the affirmative defense statutes currently available to human-trafficking victims during a 
criminal trial). 
198. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:34-1(e); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 748(D) (Neither New Jersey nor 
Oklahoma require the crime committed be directly related to the trafficking situation. Rather, these statutes 
require only that the defendant was a human-trafficking victim at the time the crime was committed.); see also 
MODEL PROVISIONS, supra note 96 (recommending states enact an affirmative defense that does not have a 
direct-relation requirement). 
199. ALA. CODE § 13A-6-159; IOWA CODE ANN. § 710A.3; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.325(4); N.H. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 645:2(IV); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:34-1(e); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 748(D); TEX. PENAL CODE 
ANN. § 43.02(d); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 939.46(1m). 
200. This statutory scheme would maintain the direct-result requirement, like Alabama, Iowa, 
Minnesota, New Hampshire, Texas, and Wisconsin. ALA. CODE § 13A-6-159; IOWA CODE ANN. § 710A.3; 
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.325(4); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 645:2(IV); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 43.02(d); WIS. 
STAT. ANN. § 939.46(1m). 
201. This Comment rejects the force or threat of force requirement that Iowa and Minnesota impose on a 
trafficking victim attempting to raise an affirmative defense. IOWA CODE ANN. § 710A.3; MINN. STAT. § 
609.325(4). 
202. See ALA. CODE § 13A-6-159; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.325(4); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 645:2(IV); 
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:34-1(e); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 43.02(d) (limiting the affirmative defense to 
prostitution and loitering for the purpose of prostitution, thereby effectively limiting the defense only to victims 
of sex-trafficking rather than human-trafficking victims). 
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an affirmative defense should not apply.203 However, these limits must not be so 
austere as to limit applicability of the affirmative defense to only one category of 
human-trafficking victims.204 The proposed affirmative defense will be neither 
too broad nor too narrow,205 and will provide relief to human-trafficking victims 
who slip through the cracks of the criminal-justice system. 
2.  Vacation of Judgment on a Showing of Human Trafficking 
While an affirmative defense is a necessary form of relief for a trafficking 
victim charged of a crime, a trafficking victim may be unwilling at the time of 
trial to take advantage of this relief by raising an affirmative defense.206 
Therefore, it is imperative—even in jurisdictions that provide an affirmative 
defense207—that states also enact a statute allowing victims to vacate a criminal 
judgment upon a showing of a then-present trafficking situation. 
As this Comment goes to press, only New York has a vacation-of-judgment 
statute.208 The first of its kind, the statute allows broad judicial discretion, as it 
does not require a showing of particular facts.209 Despite this broad judicial 
discretion, New York’s statute is nevertheless too narrow, as it applies only to 
prostitution or loitering for the purpose of engaging in prostitution.210 Therefore, a 
human-trafficking victim who commits any crime other than these two offenses 
as a direct result of a then-present trafficking situation would be left without any 
form of relief, even in New York.211 For example, in Silvia Gonzalez’s case,212 the 
court denied her motion to vacate her prior conviction for resisting arrest, 
 
203. Prohibiting the defense for homicide or other violent crimes, for example, would be a permissible 
limitation. 
204. The affirmative defense is limited to sex trafficking in the majority of jurisdictions currently 
providing such a defense. ALA. CODE § 13A-6-159; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.325(4); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
645:2; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:34-1(e); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 43.02(d). 
205. As the proposed affirmative defense statute maintains the direct-result requirement, it is not over-
broad. See supra note 198 and accompanying text. Furthermore, the proposed affirmative defense statute is not 
too limited, as it does not include a force or threat of force requirement, and it is not restricted to only 
prostitution or loitering for the purpose of prostitution. See supra note 197 and accompanying text. 
206. See supra Part II.B (discussing barriers human-trafficking victims encounter with the judicial 
system more generally); Part III.C (discussing the potential difficulties in claiming a then-present trafficking 
situation as an affirmative defense). 
207. See supra Part IV.A (analyzing mandatory human-trafficking training for law-enforcement 
officers); Part IV.B.1 (considering the affirmative defense against criminal charges). 
208. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 440.10(1)(i) (McKinney 2005 & Supp. 2012); see also supra Part III.D 
(analyzing New York’s unique vacation statute). 
209. New York v. Gonzalez, 927 N.Y.S.2d 567, 570 (Crim. Ct. 2011). “[T]he legislature did not require 
any specific corroborating facts or other evidence which would [sic] to support a defendant’s application . . . . 
By avoiding bright-line rules and formulaic determinations, the legislature squarely gave the Courts the 
discretion to grant relief pursuant to [New York Criminal Procedure Law section] 440.10(1)(i) . . . .” Id. 
210. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 440.10(1)(i). 
211. See id. (applying only to prostitution or loitering for the purpose of prostitution). 
212. See supra notes 1–8 and accompanying text. 
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because resisting arrest was “not a prostitution related offense.”213 Therefore, 
even though this crime was a direct result of a then-present trafficking situation, 
this unique form of relief remained out of Silvia’s reach.214 Furthermore, by 
limiting the statute’s applicability so narrowly to these two crimes, the statute 
effectually only applies to sex trafficking, rather than human trafficking.215 
In light of these considerations, this Comment urges states to enact a 
vacation-of-judgment statute that requires the movant show (1) the crime 
committed was a direct result of (2) a then-present human-trafficking situation. 
Like the New York statute, this proposed statute would not require a showing of 
particular facts, thereby allowing broad judicial discretion.216 However, unlike the 
New York statute, the proposed statute must not be limited solely to prostitution 
or loitering for the purpose of prostitution, thereby limiting applicability to sex-
trafficking victims.217 Nonetheless, this Comment recognizes that there are certain 
crimes to which such relief should not apply, provided those limits do not 
effectively restrict the relief’s applicability to one category of trafficking 
victims.218 In this way, the proposed vacation-of-judgment statute would apply to 
a human-trafficking victim who committed a crime due to a then-present 
trafficking situation, and would allow enough judicial discretion to provide 
effective after-the-fact relief to a trafficking victim who slips through the cracks. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The number of human-trafficking victims charged and prosecuted for 
crimes219 indicates a systemic failure within the criminal-justice system to 
recognize the crime and its players, and requires statutory changes. These 
changes must focus on both preventing dual victimization before it occurs220 and 
 
213. Gonzalez, 927 N.Y.S.2d at 569. 
214. Id. 
215. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 440.10(1)(i) (applying only to prostitution or loitering for the purpose 
of prostitution). 
216. Gonzalez, 927 N.Y.S.2d at 570. “[T]he legislature did not require any specific corroborating facts 
or other evidence which would to [sic] support a defendant’s application. . . . By avoiding bright-line rules and 
formulaic determinations, the legislature squarely gave the Courts the discretion to grant relief pursuant to [New 
York Criminal Procedure Law section] 440.10(1)(i) . . . .” Id. 
217. Cf. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 440.10(1)(i) (limiting the vacation of prior convictions statute to 
prostitution or loitering for the purpose of prostitution). 
218. See supra notes 202–04 and accompanying text. 
219. See, e.g., Gonzalez, 927 N.Y.S.2d at 568 (Sylvia Gonzalez had acquired eighty-six convictions for 
prostitution or loitering for the purpose of prostitution over a two-and-a-half year period, and law enforcement 
never recognized her as a human-trafficking victim.); New York v. G.M., 922 N.Y.S.2d 761 (Crim. Ct. 2011) 
(G.M. had acquired six convictions.); Kelleher, supra note 9 (noting that law-enforcement officers arrested 
Kelsey Collins multiple times before an officer in another state recognized her as a human-trafficking victim); 
Goldberg, supra note 9 (noting that Ms. Johnson acquired three convictions for prostitution and, despite her 
status as a minor, law enforcement never recognized her as a trafficking victim). 
220. Mandatory human-trafficking training seeks to prevent dual victimization before it occurs. See 
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providing relief for those human-trafficking victims who will inevitably slip 
through the cracks.221 This Comment urges states to enact a three-part statutory 
response to dual victimization: (1) mandatory human-trafficking training for all 
law-enforcement officers;222 (2) an affirmative defense for crimes committed as a 
direct result of a then-present human-trafficking situation;223 and (3) vacation of 
prior convictions on a showing that the crime committed was a direct result of a 
then-present human-trafficking situation.224 Of these statutory changes, only 
imposing mandatory law-enforcement training prevents dual victimization;225 
however, it is imperative that jurisdictions adopt both an affirmative defense and 
a vacation of prior conviction statute to provide relief for those victims who will 
inevitably slip through the cracks, even with the best human-trafficking training 
in place. 
 
 
supra Part IV.A (advocating each state provide mandatory human-trafficking training for law-enforcement 
officers). 
221. An affirmative defense and a vacation of prior convictions statute are important forms of relief for 
victims who slip through the cracks. See supra Part IV.B (advocating each state provide an affirmative defense 
for human-trafficking victims and provide a vacation of prior convictions statute). 
222. Mandatory human-trafficking training for all law-enforcement officers prevents dual victimization. 
See supra Part IV.A (advocating each state mandate human-trafficking training for all law-enforcement officers, 
and that this statute detail specific topics to be covered during this training). 
223. To provide relief for human-trafficking victims who slip through the cracks, jurisdictions should 
have an affirmative defense that human-trafficking victims may raise during trial on a showing that the crime 
committed was a direct result of a then-present human-trafficking situation. See supra Part IV.B.1 (advocating 
each state provide an affirmative defense for human-trafficking victims). 
224. As human-trafficking victims may be unable or unwilling to raise an affirmative defense during 
trial, jurisdictions should further provide a vacation of prior convictions statute, on which an individual may 
prevail on a showing that the convicted crime was a direct result of a then-present trafficking situation. See 
supra Part IV.B.2 (advocating each state provide a vacation of prior convictions statute). 
225. The primary issue this Comment seeks to address. 
